Abstract-In this paper, we introduce a formal notion of partial compliance, called ATTACK-RESISTANCE, of a computer program running together with a defense mechanism w.r.t a non-exploitability specification. In our setting, a program may contain exploitable vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, but appropriate defense mechanisms built into the program or the operating system render such vulnerabilities hard to exploit by certain attackers, usually relying on the strength of the randomness of a probabilistic transformation of the environment or the program and some knowledge on the attacker's goals and attack strategy. We are motivated by the reality that most largescale programs have vulnerabilities despite our best efforts to get rid of them. Security researchers have responded to this state of affairs by coming up with ingenious defense mechanisms such as address space layout randomization (ASLR) or instruction set randomization (ISR) that provide some protection against exploitation. However, implementations of such mechanism have been often shown to be insecure, even against the attacks they were designed to prevent. By formalizing this notion of attackresistance we pave the way towards addressing the questions: "How do we formally analyze defense mechanisms? Is there a mathematical way of distinguishing effective defense mechanisms from ineffective ones? Can we quantify and show that these defense mechanisms provide formal security guarantees, albeit partial, even in the presence of exploitable vulnerabilities?". To illustrate our approach we discuss under which circumstances ISR implementations comply with the ATTACK-RESISTANCE definition.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last several decades there has been impressive progress in the development and application of automated software testing [22] , [17] , [9] , [30] and formal verification techniques [15] , [16] , [18] , [10] . Despite these gains, establishing trustworthiness of software systems remains a notoriously difficult and expensive problem. Scalably guaranteeing 100% compliance of large software systems w.r.t rich specifications remains an open challenge. In fact, users simply assume that software systems will never be completely free of security vulnerabilities, despite our best efforts.
In response to this seeming inevitability of exploitable vulnerabilities in software, security researchers have proposed ingenious defense mechanisms (e.g., address space layout randomization abbreviated as ASLR [36] , randomization for a variety of memory protection schemes [5] , obfuscations [37] , program shepherding [23] , use of cryptographic devices [35] , and encrypted program execution [11] ) that, under suitable assumptions, make it "practically difficult" for resource-bounded attackers to exploit certain class of vulnerabilities even though vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows are present in the system-under-attack. Many of these mechanisms are widely used in practice because of their effectiveness against common attackers. These defense mechanisms are designed to complement traditional approaches such as testing and formal verification, and provide an additional crucial layer of security.
On the other hand, in the past years several attacks have been published against implementation of multiple of those defense mechanisms: many correspond to side-channels arising from implementations (i.e. timing side-channels against ASLR [31] and ISR [34] ), others challenge the assumptions made on the attacker's strategy (i.e. by using ROP or JOP strategies instead of straightforward injections [28] , [8] ).
Defense mechanisms distinguish themselves from formal methods and testing in the following ways: First, they give an "intuitive" yet practically effective partial guarantee of compliance of a software system w.r.t a non-exploitability specification, even though the system may have vulnerabilities in it. By partial we mean that a resource-bounded attacker can still launch an attack but the probability is vanishingly small, under suitable assumptions. By contrast, the traditional aim of formal verification is a complete guarantee or establish the absence of vulnerabilities. Testing techniques, on the other hand, are typically incomplete and provide no guarantees of compliance of a large software system w.r.t a specification. Second, defense mechanisms offer different trade-offs between completeness and scalability, when compared to testing or formal verification. For example, appropriate use of defense mechanisms may lower the burden of establishing security guarantees on software developers by not requiring them to establish full compliance while giving some measure of security, at the cost of possibly allowing certain hard-to-exploit vulnerabilities.
While the inevitability of vulnerabilities in software and the need for effective defense mechanisms has been forcefully made by many researchers in the past, and eloquently captured in a recent paper [4] , what seems largely missing is a formal characterization of the security provided by these defenses, and to some extent, a proof strategy or schema for establishing guarantees. Such a formal and precise characterization of security, in terms of a partial compliance guarantee, can be a foundational way of reasoning about and comparing defense mechanisms of all kinds using the same standard approach, just as in the field of cryptography, notions such as "semantic security" are standard ways of comparing encryption schemes.
Although in cryptography usually attackers are left unspecified and are seen as arbitrary probabilistic algorithms with a certain number of resources (for instance a number of gates which is polynomial in a security parameter, in their circuit representation), we believe that in the case of vulnerability exploitation and defense this is currently not possible: new attacker models often radically challenge the assumptions made by defenders, as illustrated by ROP, Blind ROP and JOP attacks [7] . However, we believe that making those assumptions explicit, and carefully arguing why certain defense mechanism are secure against explicit attacker classes would substantially raise the bar in practice, and allows defenders to spot subtle implementations or design errors.
In this paper, building on paradigms from cryptography and program analysis, we propose a general and formal definition of partial compliance, we call ATTACK-RESISTANCE, of a software system w.r.t a (non-exploitability) specification. The key insight of our formal program analysis approach is that a program p ∈ P together with its defense mechanisms d ∈ D (written p + d) is ATTACK-RESISTANT against a welldefined attacker (or attack model) A if the code and runtime behavior of p + d is resistant to exploitation by A, and this can be expressed using the idea of negligible success probability from cryptography. Informally, we say that p + d is ATTACK-RESISTANT to attacker A if the probability of successfully launching a remote program execution attack is negligible in a suitable security parameter. Based on this definition, we propose a formal analysis framework and a research program whose goal is to analyze the efficacy of defense mechanisms from a variety of contexts. We also discuss building blocks for a proof strategy that can be useful to show ATTACK-RESISTANCE in various contexts, and that consists in reducing the attack probability to the likelihood of guessing a random seed, which lies at the heart of most defense mechanisms, in analogy to Kerckhoffs's principle in cryptography [21] .
In sum, we make the following contributions in this "Vision and Challenges" paper:
Contributions

1)
We provide a formal definition of ATTACK-RESISTANCE and discuss a high-level proof strategy for it. 2) We show the utility of this definition and the proof strategy by analyzing and comparing different ISR implementations from the literature. 3) Finally, we suggest that unlike formal verification of arbitrary programs to establish their nonexploitability (e.g., absence of overflow vulnerabilities), in some cases it is possible to show ATTACK-RESISTANCE by only paying the cost of formally verifying the defense mechanism exactly once, irrespective of the program being defended.
II. ATTACKER MODEL
The attacker A is defined as a probabilistic algorithm that has access to a copy of the source code of the program-underattack p ∈ P (e.g., a web server) and is aware of all low-level vulnerabilities contained by p, such as buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities etc.
A has remote access to a machine M on which the vulnerable program p is running (e.g., a machine running the Apache Web Server). A can interact with p via a network channel, where it can send multiple messages and observe their respective output. More precisely A can produce k messages: m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k , where m i ∈ I and I is an input message space. Each input message is represented by finite bit strings, possibly containing the exploit and payload. A receives k outputs from p, one for each input message:
where O is the output message space. The adversary encodes a malicious program p in each input message using a probabilistic function that adaptively takes into account previously received outputs (at most k) e : P × O k → I. The attacker is not allowed side-channel access to the runtime of p (beyond what is leaked through its observations) or physical access to M. Note that although we leave A largely unspecified to account for adaptation to the interaction with p, we assume that some characteristics of the encoding function e are known (for instance that is tailored for ROP exploit construction, shellcode injection etc.). In the following we will thus denote the adversary as A e .
Note that if this function is completely unknwon, it will be practically impossible to show ATTACK-RESISTANCE of a particular defense mechanism, since new attack techniques can easily invalidate certain defense assumptions (as shown by ROP and recently by blind ROP [7] ).
If p contains a buffer overflow vulnerability, it allows uploading the payload into a part of p's process memory. If the exploit is successful it leads the control flow of p to the payload causing it to execute, thus resulting in a control-hijack attack (for further reading, we refer to the rich literature already out there on buffer overflow attacks in C/C++ programs [14] , [28] ).
Formally, the attacker A e wants to remotely execute a malicious program of his choice p ∈ S ⊂ P on a victim machine M. We define P to be the set of all programs expressed as machine code runnable on M (for instance x86 machine code), and S is a subset of P , containing malicious programs that are the target of the attacker and not containing p. We leave S unspecified and strictly smaller than P for two reasons: on the one hand, it does not make sense that S contains p, since this program is being executed on M anyway, on the other hand the notion of malicious can vary from context to context (there are many programs that are harmless if injected).
To more precisely define the goal of the attacker we consider the following event:
E(p, p , A e ) = { p runs in process p after interaction with A e } By p runs in process p we mean that there is a sequence of assembly instructions executed in the process memory of p that is semantically equivalent to p . Note that without loss of generality we can assume that for all p ∈ S, S contains all programs semantically equivalent to p . Also in the following we will refer to victim programs whose legal functionality (i.e. where no overflows are exploited) does not include interpreting inputs as programs (i.e. interpreters), since otherwise it will be clearly impossible to show ATTACK-RESISTANCE. This is similar to interface attacks in Pucella and Schneider [27] .
III. ATTACK RESISTANCE
In this Section we define the notion of ATTACK-RESISTANCE more formally.
Definition 1
We say a defense mechanism d(n) ∈ D, n ∈ N provides attack resistance for a victim program p running on a machine M against an attacker A e and a set of malicious programs S if and only if:
where is a negligible function on n.
We give a few intuitive examples here and a detailed example in Section IV:
• If e is simple code injection (appending malicious code to a message that overwrites a buffer) then some implementantions of ISR [19] provides attack resistance, given that p does not leak the seed. We will elaborate about this example in the following section.
• If e is ROP, then simple ASLR does not provide attack resistance, whereas advanced ASLR (where the base address of p is also randomized) or advanced ISR [25] do.
• If e is blind ROP [7] and k is small (or it is not allowed to restart the program enough times by the same attacker), then common ASLR provides attack resistance, otherwise it does not.
A. Proof Strategy for Establishing Attack Resistance
Note that in practice most defense mechanisms against memory management exploitability rely on the randomness of a certain run-time transformation. Ideally this randomness should guarantee security and not the complexity of the transformation, similarly as keys should be the security cornerstone of cryptographic guarantees as suggested by Kerckhoffs's principle [21] or Shannon's maxim [32] .
Therefore, a strategy for establishing ATTACK-RESISTANCE is to prove that the following sufficient conditions hold for the program p and the defense mechanism d, under the attacker model A: 1) Runtime Secret Seed: A condition for the efficacy of defense mechanisms is the existence of of bit sequence s, |s| ∈ O(n) called Runtime Secret Seed in the pair p + d of program and defense mechanism. Note that if the transformation is not probabilistic, then an attacker could eventually reverse engineer it. 2) Resistance guaranteed by keeping the seed secret:
A further condition is a Lemma relating the attack event (remotely executing a malicious program) with the probability of guessing the random seed s. In other words, to show that for each p ∈ S,
for some constant α. 3) Bounding the Attacker's probability of guessing s: A useful formal notion to measure the attacker's knowledge is to consider the entropy of s. A further condition for the efficacy of the defense mechanism d is thus that the attacker's a priori knowledge of s must be low, i.e., the a priori entropy of s is high, and that it remains high after static and dynamic analysis of p+d. This notion can be formally captured for instance by quantifying maximal leakage [33] , seen as the difference between the a priori and posteriori entropy of s after program analysis and interaction with the victim machine. This condition is important since weak defense mechanisms could have a poor key generation algorithm or some other vulnerability that decreases the ideal (maximal) entropy of the key. In other words to show is that the Pr[{A e guesses s}] ≤ (n) for intance by computing the maximal leakage of s on the network channel (defined as the difference of the entropy of s before executing p and after code analysis and observing the k output messages).
In the following section we will discuss some variants of ISR from the point of view of ATTACK-RESISTANCE.
IV. ATTACK-RESISTANCE OF ISR
In the following we discuss analyze ISR as proposed in [20] , which is supposed to be resistant against code-injection attacks. In code-injection attacks a sequence of machine code instructions are written to the stack-or heap-memory are of a running process by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability. Additionally, the attacker must overwrite the return address on the current stack frame, using a value that points to the beginning of the injected code. After the current function ends its execution, the overwritten return address is loaded in the instruction pointer register and starts executing the injected code. The idea behind ISR (illustrated in Figure 1 ) is to encode the original instructions of a program using a random key and decode them during runtime, right before execution of each instruction. Both RISC (e.g. ARM) and CISC (e.g. Intel x86) architectures use machine code instructions consisting of opcodes followed by zero or more operands. Encoding using a random key maps the values of opcode and operands to a set unknown to a remote attacker which does not have access to the key. Therefore, if the attacker does not guess the correct key, the injected code will be "decoded" before execution to a different value than intended. Depending on the number of possible instructions for that architecture, their length and the length of the key, the program will either crash or execute a different instruction than intended. We will argue about the probability of each of these outcomes in the following paragraphs. However, since there have been several attacks on ISR [34] , [38] , which are enabled by the existence of 1 and 2 byte instructions on CISC architectures such as Intel x86, we will assume only 32-bit RISC architectures in the following paragraphs. Moreover, Table I shows a broader overview of the previously mentioned attacks (first row) and the assumptions they rely on (first column). We give a few countermeasures on the right-most column which disable the attacks. In the following we will use a combination of some of these countermeasures to build a defense which is ATTACK-RESISTANCE against code-injection attacks.
ISR with XOR-ing in ECB mode: Consider a hardware implementation of ISR using a fixed length n-bit key (stored per process in kernel space), which changes on each process start-up. Furthermore, assume that the Decoder in Figure 1 is a n-bit XOR gate implemented in hardware. Let IS the instruction set for a given RISC architecture. Let |IS| = 2 l . Let n be the size in bits of an instruction. Now assume that adversary encodes a program p using e. Irrespective of his encoding strategy, the first instruction i 1 of p must be such that i 1 ∈ IS, otherwise the program will crash. If the key s is chosen uniformly at random, and has not been leaked:
because XORing with a random value is basically a random permutation in the set of possible instructions. Since l is costant for a given architecture, this function is negligible in n.
For example, the 32-bit ARM architecture has an instruction set consisting of under 2 7 instructions. Therefore in this case we obtain that the probability that an injected instruction is in IS is less or equal to 1 2 25 . Otherwise, the program will crash and will use a different key upon restart, provided there is no leakage on the key.
Preventing leakage: In the event that the program does not crash and the key is wrong, the program will execute some instruction from IS. To avoid that this executed instruction or another vulnerability in the program leaks the key such as direct key extraction and known-plaintext key extraction presented in [38] , we propose to combine ISR with secure multi-execution (SME) [13] . In this case, we SME to run two copies of the program in parallel, each randomized with a different key. Both programs receive the same input, however, before outputting anything the SME mechanism checks if the outputs of the two program copies are equal. If so, it forwards the output, otherwise the output is blocked. Under the assumption that the behavior of the program is deterministic, SME guarantees that any of the two keys will not be leaked. Thus, after proving absence of leakage of the key, we can conclude:
for α = 2 l and (n) = 1 2 n . ISR with a Stream-cipher: An alternative way to implement ISR is, instead of XOR-ing each instruction in the program with the same key, to use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) with a large periodicity, seeded by our nbit key in order to decode the programs with a stream-cipher. In this case, the length of an instruction is independent of the size of the key, and therefore we denote it with n . If the malicious program p, which the adversary wants to inject consists of j instructions [i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i j ], a successful attack requires either guessing j × n -bits or the n bits of the key. Therefore, the probability that the program does not crash and chooses another random key is:
which is far less than Pr[{i 1 ∈ IS}]. The key-guessing attack presented in [38] shows some examples of the shortest sequences of instructions that cause damage consist of at least 3 instructions. Therefore, if we consider the previous example of a 32-bit ARM architecture and substitute j by 3, we get that the probability of executing a sequence of injected code consisting of 3 instructions without crashing the program is equal to 1 2 75 . Interestingly, in this case is not sufficient to increase the key (seen as the input to the PRNG) size to achieve asymptotic better guarantees, but it is necessary to also increase the size of the instructions.
Increasing the instruction size: Note that the effective security parameter in ISR is the instruction size. Usually, the instruction size is determined by the CPU architecture, and therefore to increase it, one would need tailored hardware. Although it might be unpractical (from the efficiency perspective) to increase the instruction size to improve upon the security guarantees, it is possible to achieve this without modifications in hardware by using virtualization. For instance, virtualization obfuscation such as the one provided by Tigress 1 allows one to configure the size of the virtualized and randomized instruction set. However note that as discussed before, in practice the probability of code injections attacks for ISR on RISC (32 bit) based architectures are already vanishingly small, given guarantees on the absence of key leakage.
Issues with side channels: Under the assumptions that stack-base address randomization is not employed and that the key is not changed when restarting a program and Sovarel et al. [34] use timing side-channels to determine the key value on Intel x86 architectures. Their technique has a success rate of over 95% and requires less than 1 hour for 4096-byte keys. However, in the previous paragraphs we have assumed that the key changes on each program restart, which is enough to thwart this attack.
Partial leakage: Note that the fundamental goal to show ATTACK-RESISTANCE is that the bounding probability function (n) is negligible. Therefore, it is possible to allow some leakage on the key, if it is possible to show that this will not break the negligibility of the bounding function. This is for instance the case when leakage is constant, independent of the key size, or when it is logarithmic. In future work we plan to explore strategies to account for the possibility of side-channels that have such properties. This is important for efficiency, since for instance resampling a key after every crash is computationally expensive. However, allowing a limited number of crashes with the same key will bound the information that an adversary can gain. For instance, leakage resilient cryptography has been sucessfully applied to real implementations in the case of side-channels caused by CPU caches [3] . Alternatively, bounds on the leakage could be obtained by leveraging on quantitative estimations on implementations using techinques such as [24] .
Assumptions (down) \Attacks (right)
Return attack [34] Jump attack [34] Direct key extraction [38] Known plaintext attack [38] Chosen key attack [38] Other attacker models: Note that so far we have focused on common injection attacks. As we have discussed before, ISR together with secure multi-execution, is not resistant against other attack strategies such as ROP [28] attacks. ROP attacks do not inject code in process memory, instead they inject addresses of gadgets, which are not affected by the simple ISR implementation so far. However, to make the program ATTACK-RESISTANCE against ROP, it is possible to extend ISR with defense mechanisms such as kBouncer [26] , ASLR (randomizing the program base address), or other mechanisms that invalidate ROP (such as hardware implementations of ISR [25] ). However it is not trivial to show that the combination of this strategies provide ATTACK-RESISTANCE: they might use different seeds (of different sizes) to achieve randomness on their own and they might introduce new side-channels or attack vectors. Moreover reasoning about attacks such as ROP is more challenging, since it involves reasoning about the probability that a randomized injected address does not hit a gadget, which will strongly depend on the particular layout of the memory at the time of attack. In the future we plan to analyze this issues more carefully, and to show ATTACK-RESISTANCE of this mechanisms under certain assumptions.
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAM
Practical Value of The Proposed Formal Analysis Framework, and its difference with respect to traditional formal verification: The proposed analysis framework essentially establishes that cryptographic primitives used by the defense mechanism d are properly implemented, and that the runtime information-flow leakage technique used by d would detect and prevent all potential runtime leaks of secret bits. This is a one time cost of analyzing d, irrespective of the programs protected (if they are not trivially insecure, as in the case of interpreters). This can be accomplished by using appropriate formal verification techniques. By contrast, in traditional formal verification approaches, we have to prove that every program p is completely free of buffer overflow vulnerabilities, if our goal is 100% guarantee that p adheres to a nonexploitability specification.
Finding vulnerabilities is PSPACE-Hard: Some may argue that the vulnerability-finding problem given a program and specification is known to be PSPACE-Hard, and so the exploit-construction should be equally hard (in general undecidable) from a complexity-theoretic point of view. In what way are the guarantees being proposed here any stronger? Observe that we are not saying anything about the general exploit-construction problem, and instead focus on analysis of a parametric class of programs protected by a defense mechanism. The PSPACE-Hardness result is general, and doesn't say anything about the hardness of exploiting a given program. We are simply proposing that given a parametric class of programs, certain defense mechanisms can make it harder to exploit and this guarantee of hardness is captured precisely using the notion of ATTACK-RESISTANCE. Don't Use Unsafe Languages: Therefore, a suitable strategy for establishing ATTACK-RESISTANCE is to prove that the following sufficient conditions are true for the program p and the defense mechanism d, under the attacker model A. While true, the complex software ecosystem of today is subject to all manner of attacks, not only buffer-overflow attacks. Hence, it pays to formally analyze defense mechanisms and distinguish effective ones from the rest. The idea of ATTACK-RESISTANCE can be used to analyze any defense mechanism that relies on proper implementation and use of cryptography and guarantees against remote execution of malicious code.
Some Defense Mechanisms Shift Attacks on Integrity and/or Confidentiality to Attacks on Availability: We have assumed that d detects and prevents all attacks against p. However, in practice it is often the case that an attack is "detected" by a crash of p, which prevents an attacker from taking over the control-flow of p. This is the case for defense mechanisms such as PointGuard or its variant we present here. The threat to validity is that ATTACK-RESISTANCE refers to integrity and/or confidentiality attacks, but not availability.
Guaranteeing the absence of leakage is hard: Depending on the precise details of a defense mechanism, it can be in general harder to guarantee the absence of leakages (noninterference of the secret random see w.r.t. public outputs) than show the absence of BOFs, since non-interference is a hyper-safety property. Moreover, there is the side-channel issue discussed before: in general to guarantee the absence of certain side-channels, there is a performance penalty to be paid (such as shutting down CPU caches, constant time cryptography etc.).
VI. RELATED WORK
There is extensive use of formal methods in the security context, especially for protocol analysis [12] . There is also considerable prior work on dynamic information flow leakage [29] , and on analysis of implementation of cryptographic primitives [1] . Our work is different in that we propose the combination of such analyses to formally establish the effectiveness of defense mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge we are not aware of previous work that defines an effective way to quantify or prove such a notion.
Pucella and Schneider [27] have also formally investigated the effectiveness of randomized defenses. Their main result is to characterize such defenses as to be probabilistically equivalent to a strong typing which would guarantee memory safety for buffers, thus reducing the security of the defense mechanism to the strength of strong typing. In particular, they analyze address obfuscation [6] , a defense mechanism against memory corruption attacks, that uses a secret key to randomize the offsets of code and data in heap memory. Their idea is to treat address obfuscation as a probabilistic type checker, which has a certain probability p of crashing the program when a buffer overflow occurs. Differently from our discussion on the ATTACK-RESISTANCE of ISR against code-injection attacks in Section IV, by relating to a type checker that catches out of bound access, they automatically consider a wider range of possible attacks. However, also due to this absract charachterization, they acknowledge the difficulty on computing the probability of a successful attack, as we propose to do. We believe that different from [27] , the ATTACK-RESISTANCE framework proposed in this work can also be used to compute the probability of a successful buffer overflow against address obfuscation if we combine this defense technique with other techniques, such as SME or quantitative information flow analysis, that prevent substantial leakage of the secret key.
Sovarel et al. [34] and Weis et al. [38] also perform an analysis of the attacks against ISR presented in Table I . They compute the probability of a successful code-injection attack on a program protected by the ISR mechanism presented in [2] . Differently from our analysis they only give numeric values for these attacks on Intel x86 architectures under additional assumptions, without offering a more general overview of this probability in terms of the size of the key and the size of the instruction set and instruction sizes.
Shacham et al. [31] presented a study regarding the assessment of randomization based software defenses. Their study consisted of a concrete attack on any program containing a buffer overflow vulnerability protected by ASLR [36] . Their attacker model was similar to our in the sense that the attacker had knowledge about the vulnerabilities in the target program and only had remote access to the target machine. However, one key factor in their attack was the assumption that the remote machine is running a certain version of an Apache server, whose behavior is used as a side-channel. More specifically, if the correct offset of a libc function is sent to the Apache server, then it has a different behavior than when the guess was incorrect. Of course the attack is not dependent on Apache itself, but on a side-channel which leaks the RSS of ASLR. This attack is highly effective on 32-bit systems where, ASLR only randomizes the base address of memory pages which are 4 KBs in size. Therefore, there are only 20-bits of memory which can be randomized. Brute-forcing a randomization space of this size is practical on current hardware. Therefore, the straightforward solution to this attack is to switch to a 64-bit system. In contrast to [31] we assume that side-channels which leak the RSS do not exist.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have proposed a new notion of partial compliance that we call ATTACK-RESISTANCE using the notion of negligible success probability from cryptography. We have also shown that if a well-defined attacker's uncertainty of a random seed s remains high after interaction with p + d, and the only way to attack the system is by guessing s, then we can say that p+d is ATTACK-RESISTANT, and that the defense mechanism d is effective. We argue that this notion can be very helpful in analyzing, and helping design new defense mechanisms. Furthermore, such analysis can be useful in recognizing design and implementation weaknesses of defense mechanisms that are not ATTACK-RESISTANT. As part of future work we plan to formalize analyze the ATTACK-RESISTANCE of further popular defense mechanisms and their combinations, to discuss their strength against common attacker models, and to explore relaxations of information flow guarantees (such as quantitative bounds on entropy reduction), to account for efficient implementations of defense mechanisms.
